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S O M E

Further Particulars

I N

R E L A T I O N

T O T H E

C A S E

O F

Admiral B Y N G.

F R O M

ORIGINAL PAPERS, &c.

Fiat Justitia!

By a GENTLEMAN of OXFORD.

L O N D O N:

Printed for J. L A C Y, at the Corner of *St. Martin's Court*,
St. Martin's Lane, near *Leicester-Fields*; and are to be
sold at all the Pamphlet Shops and Bookfellers in *London*
and *Westminster*. 1756.

[Price One Shilling.]

the 11th/20th/12

S O M E

Interesting Particulars

Tending to EXPLAIN

The late Conduct of A—B—.

THE cruel Situation of A——
B——, in being expos'd to the
Resentment of the Nation for not
doing what was not in his Power to do,
and left to the Mercy of those who are
possibly predetermined to shew him none, ap-
pears already in so glaring a Light, that a
bare Mention of the Fact, is sufficient to
introduce all that is here to be said upon
it.

Nor will it be thought, I hope; indecent
or improper for the Friends of a Gentleman,
labouring under such a Variety of Pressures,
to offer a Word or two to the Publick in
his Vindication.

B

How

How heavy a Load has been laid upon him, and with what exemplary Patience he has borne it, is obvious to the whole World: And as an Interval of Candour and Moderation may possibly recur, when it will be asked, by what strange Fatality he was brought into such a Situation, it is a Duty incumbent on a Man, innocent and injur'd like him, to be provided with an Answer.

And, indeed, whoever has at present Composure enough to see Things as they really are, must be struck with no small Degree of Astonishment, in observing, what slight Premisses have produced these extraordinary Consequences.

For as yet all that has been made Public concerning this supposed Criminal, (I mean that is supported by any Degree of Authority) amounts to no more than this; That he sail'd, arriv'd, and fought the Enemy as soon as he could: and that, if he did not obtain a compleat Victory, so neither did he suffer any considerable Loss.

Scraps and Fragments of Intelligence, generally

nerally in the most abusive Language, have it is true been inserted from time to time in the News-Papers, under the Pretence of Letters from on Board his Fleet: But if the Matter they contain could have been rely'd on, even by those who have made so unfair a Use of it, it would, no doubt, have been reserv'd, to be given in Evidence at his Trial: And if they could not rely upon it, any Attempt to impose it on the Public, ought to be resent'd, as it deserves.

For their own sakes it ought to be resent'd; for without the Help of such unfair Practices, from time to time repeated, a People so deservedly famous for their good Nature and Generosity, could not have been induced to act as they have done, in a Manner repugnant to the first Principles of Justice and Humanity, which provide, That the oppress'd should be sacred from Insults, and the accus'd from Censure, till a regular Course of Proofs has demonstrated their Guilt: So often as it appears in our Annals, that such an unnatural Ferment has been rais'd, and directed to the Ruin of any particular Man, it appears to have been rais'd and directed by the same

Means: and that within the Compass of a very few Years, we should twice be taken in the same Snare, is not the best Compliment to our Memories.

But I proceed now to the Particulars propounded at the Head of this Paper.

On the 17th of *March* the Admiral receiv'd his Commission, and took the Oaths as Admiral of the Blue: On the 20th he arriv'd at *Portsmouth*, and found Letters from the Board, forbidding him to meddle with any Men belonging to the *Torbay*, *Essex*, *Nassau*, *Prince Frederick*, *Colchester* and *Greyhound* (all which Ships were said to be wanted for the most pressing Service) or, if it was possible to be avoided, with any Men belonging to any other Ship in a serviceable Condition. The same Letters also directed him, to compleat the manning and fitting the *Stirling-Castle*, in Preference to any other Ship, as she also was wanted for the same most pressing Service.

On the 21st at Sun-Rising, he hoisted his Flag on Board the *Ramillies*: Six other Ships of his Squadron, viz. The *Buckingham*,
Culloden,

Culloden, *Captain*, *Revenge*, *Kingston*, and *Defiance* were at *Spithead*; two, the *Trident* and *Lancaster* were in the Harbour fitting for Sea; and the *Intrepid* was not as yet sail'd from the *Nore*.

For these nine Ships, seven Hundred and Twenty-three Men were wanting, of which two Hundred and Forty were short of Compliment, two Hundred and Ninety-one lent to Ships at Sea, and one Hundred and Ninety-two sick in the Hospital.

It is observable, that in the Evening of this Day he received a Letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty, pressing the utmost Diligence in getting his Squadron into sailing Order, marking the Necessity of his so doing from the Necessity of the Service, which requir'd him as soon as possible in the *Mediterranean*, and inclosing the Reason, in an Extract of a Letter from the Earl of *Bristol* at *Turin*, to Mr. *Fox*, dated *March* the 6th, and communicating a Design of the *French* to make a Descent on *Minorca*.

To

To this Letter the Admiral the next Day return'd the Assurances requir'd, that he was using all possible Dispatch : Specifying, That in seven or eight Days he hoped all the Ships under his Command would be ready in every Respect, excepting Men ; and accompanying this with a State of the Ships both in *Portsmouth* Harbour and at *Spithead*, that their Lordships might issue their Orders accordingly.

For, by the said State it appear'd, that over and above the ten Ships assign'd to the Admiral, there lay at *Spithead*, at that Instant, no less than Twelve Men of War of the Line ; that is to say, the *Prince* of 90 Guns, the *Prince George* of 80, the *Invincible* and *Torbay* of 74, the *Monmouth*, *Yarmouth*, *Essex*, *Nassau* and *Prince Frederick* of 64, and the *Nottingham* and *Princess Augusta* of 60 ; to which may be added the *Anson* of 60, which came in three Days after, and the *Fire-Brand*, fire Ship.

All these Ships, it is to be observ'd, were either full mann'd, or nearly so, and four of them were Mann'd above their Compliments. And those in the Harbour were the *Royal Ann*

Ann and *Duke* of 90 Guns, the *Barfleur* of 80, the *Swiftsure*, *Bedford*, and *Elizabeth* of 64, the *Bristol* and *Colchester* of 50, the *Romney* of 40, and the *Greyhound*, *Gibraltar*, *Nightingale* and *Unicorn* of 20; all of which, except the four first were also full mann'd, or nearly so.

But the sending this List did not answer the Admiral's End; no Orders came for supplying the Defect of Men till the 25th, when the Admiral was directed to take them out of the (a) Tenders and Hospitals; and then not till the Compliment of the *Stirling Castle* had been compleated first; which is so much the more remarkable, as he received an Express the Day before to dispatch Mr. *Keppel* in the *Effex* and *Gibraltar* to Sea, as soon as possible, and to supply the said Ships with what Number of Men they wanted out of the *Nassau*.

To shew, however, how well their Lordships understood Business, and how notably

(a) Tenders expected to arrive from *Liverpool* and *Ireland*, two only of which arrived before the Fleet sailed, the greatest Part of the Men from them put on board the *Sterling Castle*; the whole Number 198.

they

they could conduct it; on the 26th at five in the Evening it was the Admiral's Turn to receive an Express, informing him, that the *Ludlow-Castle* was order'd to *Spithead* from her Cruife, with the Men borrow'd from the *Ramillies*; and directing him to take from aboard the *Stirling-Castle* the Men by former Orders shipp'd on board her out of the Tenders, together with 100 Men to be discharg'd out of the *Augusta*, towards completing the Compliments of his Squadron. He was also directed by the same Express, to distribute all the Marines he had on board among the several Ships at *Spithead* and in *Portsmouth* Harbour, and to receive Lord *Robert Bertie's* Regiment of Royal *English* Fuziliers in their Room. An Operation, which, together with procuring them Bedding, &c. found Employment for the Lieutenants, Boats, &c. till the 30th inclusive: And the next Day was employed in completing the Officers, Stores, Provisions, Water, &c.----

And now *April* the first at ten in the Morning, the Admiral received by an Express a Letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty, together with his Instructions, dated
March

March the 30th, inclos'd, which the same Secretary had on the 21st of the Month preceding prepar'd him to expect on the 23d following: The Letter required him, in the Name of the Board, to put to Sea with the first fair Wind, and to proceed without Loss of Time to the *Mediterranean*: There was also inclos'd in it, an Order for receiving on Board his Squadron Lord *Robert Bertie's* Regiment of Royal Fuziliers, for what Service will be explained in the Sequel: And of the said Instructions, it will be sufficient in this Place to say, That of all the Articles they were compos'd of, there is but one (regarding the Operations of the Enemy must be understood) positive; namely; That repeated by the Secretary, which required him to put to Sea as soon as possible, &c. For tho' it is admitted in the introductory Clause, That several Advices had been receiv'd, concerning the *suppos'd Intentions* of the *French* to attack the Island of *Minorca*, the next supposes, that their real Design was to slip through the *Straits of Gibraltar*, and direct their Course to *North America*; and makes a suitable Provision, for separating the Squadron, and sending off such a Part of it under Rear Admiral *West*, together with such a

proportionable Number of the Soldiers on board, as, added to the Ships he was suppos'd to find there, would render him *Superior* to the Enemy (in which Case it is to be noted, the said Soldiers could not have serv'd in the *Mediterranean* at all, and for this, that a Superiority was judg'd to be a requisite, essential to the Service.) And all the other Articles hingeing in like manner, upon Events, were accordingly, to be observed or not, as Circumstances agreed or otherwise.

In obedience to these Instructions and Orders, therefore, he directed the Captains of his Squadron, to take on board all the Men they had in the Hospitals, fit for Service, and to discharge all the Absent, that he might know exactly the Number wanting to compleat his Compliment; which in the Evening of the same Day were found to be 336; the greatest Part of them lent to the *Ludlow-Castle*, (a) *Hampton-Court*, and *Tilbury*, which were still at Sea: of this Defect he sent Information at four the next Morning by Express to the Board, desiring

(a) The *Hampton-Court* then at *Lisbon*, the *Tilbury* at *Cork* in *Ireland*.

their Lordships final Orders, in relation thereto, and it may be supposed he was so much the more sensible of it, because the *Torbay*, *Essex* and *Gibraltar* had sail'd Eastward on a Cruise the Evening before.

That Morning, however, about nine o'Clock, the *Ludlow-Castle* came to *Spithead*, and about four in the Afternoon repaid the borrow'd Men: With her also came in the *Intrepid*, Captain *Young*, having 261 Supernumeraries on board, but then 156 of these were wanting to make up the Compliment of that very Ship: So that there was still a Necessity to take 30 from the *Stirling-Castle*, and 70 Supernumeraries from the *Cambridge*, notwithstanding he had taken 43 from the *Colchester* and *Romney* before; which, without an Order from above, was done accordingly.

By these Shifts and in this precarious Manner, by the 3d of *April*, while the Squadron was getting under Sail in order to repair to *St. Helens*, the Deficiency of Men was supply'd: But then it ought not to be forgot, that Captain *Young*, upon receiving Orders the Day before to put himself under the

Admiral's Command, and to receive on board the only Company of Lord *Robert Bertie's* Regiment, not yet embark'd, waited upon him, with a Representation, That the *Intrepid* was not fit for a foreign Voyage, having made so much Water in her Passage from the *Nore* to *Spithead*, though her Ports were caulk'd in, that he was forc'd to scuttle the lower Deck, and let the Water down, in order to have it pump'd out: That he had receiv'd no Notice of his being destin'd for any such Voyage, and that he had neither Water, Provisions, or Stores for it.

This was as bad News for the Admiral as for him: However, as there was now no Remedy, on the 4th all the long Boats with an Officer in each, were order'd to repair to *Spithead* with empty Water Casks from the *Intrepid*, there to exchange them with the different Ships, for full ones; and in the mean while, her own Officers and Boats were employed in procuring and taking in the necessary Stores, Provisions, &c.

The next Day, the Admiral having issued out the Line of Battle-Signals, made

the Signal at 11 o'Clock to weigh, and stood to Sea, but was forc'd by the Tide of Ebb, accompany'd with a Calm, to anchor again at three in the Afternoon.

I had almost forgot to specify, that on the 2^d of *March* in the Afternoon, the Admiral receiv'd a List from the Admiralty, of thirty Officers, including two Colonels, order'd to their Posts at *Minorca*, together with thirty-two Recruits and eight Deserters; and of sixteen Officers, one Corporal, two private Men, and thirty-eight Recruits for *Gibraltar*; together with Orders to take them on board; which was done accordingly, as fast as they arriv'd; and that was not the Case with some of them till the Fleet was actually under sail.

And to this Recollection, I must also beg Leave to add another; namely, that the Admiral having, *March* 24, apply'd by Letter to the Board for an additional Frigate to repeat Signals, in case of coming to Action with the Enemy in his Passage out, he was never favour'd with any Answer to that Paragraph.

With

With the Squadron already particularis'd, then, on the 6th of *April*, he again put to Sea, palpably as soon as it was possible for him to do so, and after a tedious Voyage, occasion'd as well by *Calms*, as *contrary Winds*, arriv'd at *Gibraltar*, *May* the 2d.

What necessity for being thus circumstantial will be shewn in its Place.

And, as Premises never to be lost Sight of, it is here to be observ'd, That as the Admiral's Instructions were, in general, founded on a Persuasion, that the *French* Armament at *Toulon*, was destin'd to *North-America*, so it was declar'd with the utmost Confidence, by those who ought to have known better, that, for want of Seamen, six or eight Ships of the Line at most, was the greatest Number the Enemy could possibly put to Sea from that Port.

For hence it is apparent, First, That we had either no true Intelligence at Home of what was really in Agitation at *Toulon*, or that we gave no Credit to it. Secondly, That Instructions unprecise in their Nature, because founded on Mistakes and Uncertainties,

tainties, accompany'd with Orders yet more unprecise and embarrassing, (as having nothing clear in them, but the Negligence or Ignorance of the Writers) could not but be productive of Perplexities and Difficulties in every Question they gave Rise to, consequently of Snares and Dangers in every Resolution taken upon them. Thirdly, That from the very different Aspect of Things on the Admiral's arrival at *Gibraltar*, from that which they had been made to wear in *England*, a Difference of Conduct became absolutely necessary; and thenceforward, he was either to proceed discretionally, or not to proceed at all.

Instead of six or eight Men of War of the Line, he was informed the Enemy had put to Sea on the 13th of *April*; *N. B.* (just a Week after the Admiral set sail from *St. Hellens*) with a Squadron of twelve Ships from sixty to eighty Guns; five Frigates from twenty to fifty; two Xebeques of eighteen, four Gallies, two Galliot, four Bombs, escorting 233 transports, with 18000 soldiers on Board, and 50 vessels freighted with Cattle, Stores, &c. And that instead of steering for *North-America*,

America, they had not only made a Descent on *Minorca*, but were moreover in actual Possession of the Whole Island, *Fort St. Philip* excepted.

I say then with this Difference in the real State, as well as the Aspect of Things, surely the most partial or violent Man in *Britain*, will not take upon him to insist, that the Admiral ought to have gone in immediate Quest of an Enemy so much his Superior in Point of Strength, for the mere Vanity of such a desperate Attempt ! Surely the Difference between Brutality and Bravery is better understood amongst us ; and none but the very, very Vulgar, are subject to that groundless Notion, That it is a Fundamental in the Navy-Discipline, for every *English* ship to engage two of the same Force of any other Nation !

And let none of these partial or violent Persons exult too hastily, because I have not as yet brought Commodore *Edgcombe's* little Squadron to account.

So much in the Dark as we manifestly were with regard to the Motions and Designs

signs of the Enemy, and so much astonish'd and surpriz'd as we were known to be, when Day-light unawares broke in upon us; we have no Right to reckon on any one of the Ships that compos'd it. It is, besides, notorious, that they were all in the Enemy's Power; and that they did not actually fall into their Hand, was owing only to want of due Intelligence on their Side, and due Precautions to supply the Defect of it, which also contains a Brief of our own unhappy Case, with respect to *Minorca*.

Some little Reserve of good Fortune, then, is all the Merit we can pretend to on that Account: And when we farther see in what a Condition those Ships fell under the Admiral's Command, we shall find it was more owing to his good Conduct, than to any Foresight any where else, that they were at last render'd serviceable. — Which brings us to the Consideration of what pass'd on the Admiral's arrival at *Gibraltar*.

It was then from Mr. *Edgecumbe* himself, whom he found at *Gibraltar*, with
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the *Deptford*, *Princess Louisa*, and *Fortune* Sloop, part of his Squadron, that he receiv'd the Information cited above: And having now, for the first Time, one positive Fact to reason upon, *to wit*, that *Port St. Philip* was actually besieged, with a great Force compleatly furnished with all Manner of Ammunition and Provision, and the Siege cover'd with a Squadron abundantly stronger and better appointed, than had enter'd into any of the *Supposers* Heads to suppose possible, who dictated his Orders; it must be understood his first Concern was to consider, how he was best to conduct himself in Conformity to those Orders.

The *American* IF stated in the second Clause, as the Point of most *Probability*, with Respect to the *Design* of the *French* Armament, and yet again recurr'd to, and implicated in the third, was now out of the Question; as was also another in the same Clause, IF the *French* were still inactive in Port, in which Case he was to station his Squadron, (still suppos'd all-sufficient) in the best Manner to prevent their getting out: And he was now to *use all possible*

possible Means in his Power (the learned and able Secretary is to be answerable for this Tautology) for the Relief of the Place, taking proper Care, nevertheless, to exert his utmost Vigilance to protect *Gibraltar* from any hostile Attempt; which is not only understood, but expressed in his Orders; as also to protect the Trade of his Majesty's Subjects, and to annoy the Enemy wherever they might be found within the * *Limits of his Command*; with an Exception, however, to the Ports of the *Ottoman* Empire, which was with the utmost Circumspection guarded against.

And now what his Conduct really was, we shall endeavour to shew.

As soon as he had received from Commodore *Edgecumbe* the Information specified above, which was the Day of his Arrival, he issued immediate Orders, for all the Ships of his Squadron to compleat their

* It seems his Orders did not empower him to attack the Enemy, even if he met them, without the Limits of his Command, as War was not then declared.

Provisions and Water with the utmost Expedition.

On the third he went on Shore to communicate to the Governor of *Gibraltar* his Orders in relation to a Battallion, to be detach'd from the Garrison, and to be embark'd on Board the Squadron for the Relief of *Fort St. Philip*.

The Governor had also Orders delivered to him from the War Office ; which, it seems, were to have been of the same Tendency, whether in Fact they were so or not : But, waving that Point for a Moment, new Matter in Abundance having arisen, which had not been so much as suppos'd at the Time of Penning them, and such as had been productive of Difficulties, hardly if at all to be surmounted, it was thought proper, in the first Place, to take the Opinion of the Engineers best acquainted with the Works of *Fort St. Philip* (the principal of whom had not only been in Service there, but when at Home, had been promoted to the Post he then held, on the Merit of bringing Home a Model of the Place) concerning the Possibility or
Pro-

Probability of relieving the same, and they gave it under their Hands the same Day, That all Circumstances considered, it appear'd to them extremely dangerous, if not impracticable, to throw Succour into it.

This Opinion of the Engineers was moreover submitted on the Morrow, to a Council of War, compos'd of the Governor and all the Field Officers of the Garrison assembled, to take into Consideration the several Orders above acceded to.

And by the Way, tho' much has already been said of those from the War Office to General *Fowke*, and more of the Usage they have unhappily expos'd him to, it is hop'd the public will forgive a short Interjection in the Shape of Queries on the same Subject, which may possibly serve to throw some additional Light upon it. *To wit.*

Whether the Land and Sea service, are not distinct from and independent of each other? Whether they are not accordingly under the Direction of distinct Offices and Officers? Whether those employ'd in either of
the

the said Services, are Subject to any Orders, but such as are address'd to them through the proper Office they belong to? Whether for Example, an Order from the Secretary at War, can be understood to be of Authority to the Fleet, and *vice versa* from the Admiralty Board to the Army? Whether when both Offices are to co-operate in the same Service, the Orders given by both, ought not to correspond exactly in every Circumstance? Whether, in case of reciprocal Ignorance in each Office as to what is doing in the other, this necessary Co-operation might not be obtain'd, if the Secretary of State was in the Secret of both, as he ought to be, and was to give his Instructions accordingly? And lastly, When the Orders in relation to the same Service issued from both, instead of corresponding as above required, happen to be irreconcilable, whether the Land-officers are not to be justify'd, in adhering to those of the War Office, and the Sea Officers to those of the Admiralty?

And now having put these Questions which answer themselves, what is to follow is an Abstract of the two Commands. Videlicet. In the first Paragraph of Lord
Bar-

Barrington's first Letter to the General, dated *March* 21, 1756, it is said, The King has order'd the Royal Regiment of Fuziliers to embark immediately for *Gibraltar*, and that upon their *arrival* he is to make a Detachment from the four Regiments then in Garrison to *Minorca*: Which implies surely, That if the Detachment was to go, the Regiment was to stay. But, as if for fear this should not be plain enough, the next Paragraph is express, That together with the Recruits for the Corps in his Garrison, the said Regiment was to be *disembark'd*, and *quarter'd* in the *Garrison* under his Command: Upon which said Disembarkation, he the said General, in obedience to his Majesty's *further* Pleasure, was to cause a Detachment, equal to a Batallion on the present *British* Establishment, to embark for *Minorca*. The next, without the least Reference to or Repeal of any Part of the former, reiterates the Order for causing a Batallion to embark on board his Majesty's Fleet for the Relief of the Island of *Minorca*, in case there should be any *likelihoood* of its being attack'd. And the third, of *April* 1st, only directs him to receive such Women and Children belonging to the Royal Regiment of Fuziliers,

as Admiral *Byng* should think fit to land there; such is the War Office Language: And now what it ought to have been, we are to learn it seems, from that made use of by the Lords of the Admiralty in their additional Instructions to Mr. *Byng* of *March* 31. For therein it is not only signified, That the King had been pleas'd to direct, that the Royal Regiment of Fuziliers should serve on Board his Majesty's Ships in the *Mediterranean*, and also be landed at *Minorca* in Case the said Island was attack'd, and upon a Consultation with General *Blakeney*, it should be found necessary; but, moreover, that the Governor of *Gibraltar* had Orders (which we have seen he had not) to make a Detachment equal to a Batallion from his Garrison, in Case of a like Necessity for a further Reinforcement: And this Detachment, together with the said Regiment, the Admiral was required to land at *Minorca* under the Restrictions before specify'd, together with what other Assistance of Gunners and Men his Ships could possibly spare.

On the fourth of *May* the Council of War sat on these several Orders, together
with

with the written Opinion of the Engineers, and the Situation of his Majesty's Garrisons and Forces in the *Mediterranean*; on a full Consideration of which, they were humbly of Opinion, that the sending the said Detachment would evidently weaken the Garrison of *Gibraltar*; and be no way effectual for the Relief of *Minorca*: Assigning for the Grounds and Reasons of this Opinion, That of the Engineers already mention'd, touching the Impracticability of introducing any Succours into the Place, the Insufficiency of the Number propos'd, if introduc'd for the Defence and Preservation of the Island in its present Condition, which seem'd to be the Scope and Meaning of the Letters and Orders before them: And the Imprudence of weakening the Garrison of *Gibraltar*, unnecessarily risking the Loss of an additional Number of his Majesty's Troops, without any reasonable Prospect or Hope of being of any Assistance to *Minorca*. To which was added the following Reason; which it will be expedient to give in their own Words. *To wit.*

“ Because the *Toulon* Squadron, by the
 “ best Accounts the Council have receiv'd,
 “ is at least equal in Force, if not Superior

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“ to

“ to that under Admiral *Byng*: And should
 “ the *British* Fleet be *any way weaken’d* by
 “ any *Engagement*, or any other *Accident*,
 “ the Garrison of *Gibraltar* would be ex-
 “ pos’d to *imminent* Danger; and as the Gar-
 “ rison stands *at present*, it is not more than
 “ sufficient to the *common* Duty of the Gar-
 “ rison.”

But tho’ they were induc’d by these Considerations not to go the Lengths indeterminately requir’d, which would have expos’d one Place, without preserving the other, they discover’d a Disposition to do whatever could be prudently done for the Good of the Service. Captain *Edgecumbe*, before his Departure from Fort *St. Philip*, had put on Shore all the Soldiers and Marines he had on Board his Ships, together with a considerable Number of Seamen, to make some small Addition to a Garrison notoriously deficient, and so far at least prolong the Defence of the Place; by which means, however, his Ships were left so thinly mann’d, that in case of an Engagement, no Service could have been expected from them. To remedy this Defect and enable these Ships to proceed to Sea, the Admiral apply’d to General *Fowke* for
 such

such a Detachment out of his Garrison as he could spare; and with the Approbation of the same Council of War, the General did accordingly furnish him, with one Captain, six Subalterns, nine Serjeants, eleven Corporals, five Drums, and two hundred thirty-five private Men: in all two hundred sixty-seven.

It was not, however, till the 6th, that he receiv'd a List of these from the Governor; and the very next Day also the *Experiment* join'd his Squadron, as the *Portland* and *Dolphin* had done two Days before: And now having dispatch'd two Expresses to *England*; that is to say, one on the 4th by the Way of *Madrid*; and a Duplicate of the same on the 7th by Lieutenant *O'Hara*, in the *Lovel Packet*; and having also done his best to supply all the Wants of his Squadron, on the 8th in the Morning he set sail, tho' the Wind was Easterly, and before his Ships were full water'd, which was owing not to any Neglect imputable either to Officers or Seamen, but the small Quantity of Water supply'd by the Springs themselves.

The Winds proving variable, and often interrupted by Calms, it was the 16th before

the Squadron could get up as far as *Palma*, the Capital of *Majorca*; and here the Admiral thought fit to send the *Experiment* to that Port, with a Letter to the Consul for what Intelligence he could supply him with; about which Time, a Ship close in with the Shore (discover'd afterwards to be the *Gracieuse*, a Frigate of thirty Guns; that, together with another Ship, suppos'd to be the *Amphion* of fifty, which quitted that Station the Day before, had cruiz'd off of that Port, and kept in the *Phœnix* for near three Weeks) was observ'd to stand away to the Eastward, with a fine Breeze, whilst the Squadron in the Offing was in a Manner becalm'd: And the next Day in the Afternoon, the *Experiment* rejoin'd the Squadron, (which was standing to the Eastward) with the *Phœnix* in Company, which last brought the Admiral some Intelligence of the Quantity of Cannon, Ammunition, and Provision, landed at *Minorca* by the Enemy, as also of their Manner of landing, and of treating the Inhabitants.

The Wind still continued Easterly, until the 18th at nine in the Evening, when a fine Breeze

Breeze sprung up Northerly, and the Fleet failed large all Night.

The 19th at Day break, the Squadron being off the Coast of *Minorca*, about five o'Clock in the Morning, the Admiral sent the *Phoenix*, Captain *Hervey*, with the *Chesterfield* and *Dolphin*, Captain *Lloyd*, and Captain *Marlow*, a Head of the Fleet, to reconnoitre as closely as possible, the Harbour's Mouth, and the Situation both of the Enemy and their Batteries, as also to observe whether it was practicable, and where to throw any Succours into the Castle, to look out for the *French* Squadron, and to pick up if possible any of their small Craft, in order to procure Intelligence; in relation to all which Purposes, proper Signals were appointed for the Admiral's Information.

Captain *Hervey* was also charged with the following Letter from the Admiral to General *Blakeney*.

Ramillies

Ramillies off Minorca, May 19, 1756.

S I R,

“ I Send you this by Captain *Hervey* of his
 “ Majesty’s Ship *Phœnix*, who has my
 “ Orders to convey it to you if possible, to-
 “ gether with the inclosed Packet, which he
 “ received at *Legborn*.

“ I am extremely concerned to find that
 “ Captain *Edgcumbe* has been obliged to re-
 “ tire to *Gibraltar* with the Ships under his
 “ Command, and that the *French* are land-
 “ ed, and *St. Philip’s Castle* is invested; as
 “ I flatter myself had I fortunately been
 “ more timely in the *Mediterranean*, that I
 “ should have been able to have prevented
 “ the Enemy’s getting a footing on the
 “ Island of *Minorca*.

“ I am to acquaint you that General *Stu-*
 “ *art*, Lord *Effingham* and Colonel *Cornwal-*
 “ *lis*, with about thirty Officers and some
 “ Recruits belonging to the different Regi-
 “ ments now in Garrison with you, are on
 “ board the Ships of the Squadron, and shall
 “ be glad to know by the Return of the Of-
 “ ficer,

“ ficer, what Place you will think proper to
 “ have them landed at.

“ The Royal Regiment of *English* Fuzi-
 “ liers, commanded by Lord *Robert Bertie*,
 “ is likewise on Board the Squadron destin-
 “ ed, agreeable to my Orders, to serve on
 “ Board the Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, un-
 “ less it should be thought necessary upon
 “ Consultation with you to land the Regi-
 “ ment for the Defence of *Minorca*; but I
 “ must also inform you, should the Fuziliers
 “ be landed, as they are Part of the Ships
 “ Compliments; the Marines having been
 “ ordered by the Lords Commissioners of
 “ the Admiralty on Board of other Ships at
 “ *Portsmouth*, to make Room for them, that
 “ it will disable the Squadron from act-
 “ ing against that of the Enemy, which I am
 “ informed is cruising off the Island; however
 “ I shall gladly embrace every Opportunity
 “ of promoting his Majesty’s Service in the
 “ most effectual Manner, and shall assist you
 “ to distress the Enemy, and defeat their
 “ Designs to the utmost of my Power.”

“ Please to favour me with Information
 “ how I can be most effectual of Service to
 “ you

“ you and the Garrison ; and believe me to
 “ be, with great Truth and Esteem,

S I R,

Your most Obedient,

Humble Servant,

J. B.

Captain *Hervey's* Orders were to deliver this Letter if possible to the General, and as with a View to some such Service as this, a private Signal had been agreed upon between him and Captain *Scroope* of the *Dolphin*, who was in the Castle, and had kept his Boat, in order to come off upon Occasion, it was understood the said Letter would be delivered accordingly.

The Frigates thus dispatch'd with a fresh Gale Northerly, got round a small Island call'd the *Laire of Mahon*, about half an Hour before nine o'Clock, and when under the Land, fell into light Airs of Wind and Calms, but nevertheless, continued to make the best of their Way for the Harbour's Mouth.

About an Hour after the Squadron also got
 round

round the said Island, with a fresh Gale; and when within two or three Miles of *St. Philip's* Castle, (which was full in sight, with the *French* Colours flying before it at a small Distance, and both Sides at Intervals exchanging Shots as well as Shells) fell in as the Frigates had done before, with light Breezes and Calms;

And now it was that Capt. *Hervey* in the *Phoenix* still standing on for the Harbour's Mouth, made his private signals, but without the desir'd Success: No Answer was made: No Boat came off: And the Enemy's Squadron appearing at the same Time in the S. E. Quarter, the Admiral call'd in his Frigates; bore away for the Enemy, and made the general Signal to chase.

Both Squadrons made Sail towards each other, and about two in the Afternoon, the Admiral made the Signal for the Line of Battle a Head, which for want of sufficient Wind, could not be form'd so properly as it ought to have been. His next Care was to furnish such of his Ships as were sickly, and ill mann'd (which was the Case of several) with Seamen from the Frigates——

F

Thus

Thus he order'd 30 Men out of the *Phœnix* into the *Revenge*, and 20 into the *Deptford*; 40 out of the *Experiment* into the *Captain*, and 20 into the *Lancaster*, and out of the *Dolphin* 20 to the *Intrepid*, 20 to the *Defiance*, and 17 to the *Portland*.

Upon Captain *Hervey's* Representation, that there were proper Materials on Board the *Phœnix* (long ago reported Home unfit for Service) to convert her into a Fire-Ship, he issued Orders accordingly; under such Restrictions, nevertheless, as should not prejudice the Ship, in case she was not made use of in the Manner intended, to board, and burn any Ship of the Enemy's Squadron, that might happen to be disabled.

These Measures having been thus taken, a fine Breeze sprung up about seven in the Evening, and brought the two Squadrons within about two Leagues of each other; when almost at the same Instant both tack'd, no doubt, for the same Reasons, Namely, To avoid the Confusion of a Night-Engagement; as also, the *English* to gain, and the *French* to keep the Weather-Gage, which the Wind and the Situation
of

of the two Squadrons, had, at that Time, given them Possession of.

Night now came on, and the Wind freshening, the Admiral stood in towards the Shore, till half an hour after eleven, when he made the Signal for Tacking, and then taking advantage of the Wind from the Shore, stood off for the Remainder of the Night.

On the 20th, the Morning proving hazy, the Enemy were not to be seen; and two of their Tartans, falling in with our Rear by Mistake; one of them (having on Board upwards of 100 Soldiers, Part of 600, embarked from the Enemy's Camp the Day before to re-inforce the Fleet) was taken by the *Defiance*.

About seven, however, the Enemy were descry'd to the South-East, and the Admiral made the Signal for calling in his Cruizers; repeating it with several Guns at a small Distance of Time from each other, till it had been seen and observ'd by all of them.

About ten he tack'd, and stood towards

the Enemy; and having by the Dint of Seamanſhip, not only kept the Wind againſt all the Efforts of the *French* Commander to weather him, but form'd as compleat a Line as could be form'd, began the Attack, which the Enemy lay to, to receive.——— The Particulars of what followed cannot be expected here. The Admiral has now more dangerous Enemies to combat with, than he had then. And for the ſake of a compleat Narrative, muſt not throw away the Materials of his Defence.----When the proper Time comes, every Man that is open to Conviction, will be convinced, that he acted in all Reſpects ſuitably to the great Truſt repos'd in him; that without impairing the Honour, he never once loſt Sight of the real Intereſt of his Country; ---That in every Order he gave, he made the beſt Uſe that he could poſſibly make of his Underſtanding; ----That even what ſeems to be ſo inexplicable, with Regard to his ordering the *Deptford* out of the Line, will receive the moſt clear and ſatisfactory Explanation; -----That the odious Imputations thrown on his perſonal Behaviour, are as groundleſs as wicked; ----That he had, indeed the *Pleaſure* to ſee the Enemy give Way to the Impreſſions made upon them.---

them ; ---- And that nothing could equal his Mortification in not being in a Condition to follow them.

What his Condition really was, and what the Condition of the *Mediterranean* Service in general, he was now sadly sensible. “ Instead of encountering six or seven Ships at most, he had met with twelve,” far superior in Strength, far better mann’d, and far better Sailors than his own. ---- These had suffered less in the Engagement, could be supply’d perpetually with fresh Men from the Camp on Shore, as had already been the Case; were near their own Ports; could return to the Charge with these Advantages whenever they pleas’d, and if they pleas’d to retreat could not be overtaken. ---- His own Ships, on the contrary, such at least as had borne the Brunt of the Action, had sustained more Damage, than could easily be repair’d. The *Intrepid* from the very beginning, was not fit for the Service she had been allotted to, on the Evidence of her own Commander*; the *Portland* had not been cleaned for upwards of ten Months,

* See the Admiral’s first Letter to the Admiralty Board, already publish’d,

nor the *Chesterfield* for twelve: And as to the Careening-wharfs, Store-houses, Pits, &c. at *Gibraltar*, they were entirely decay'd.—The Wounded were now moreover to be added to the Sick; and no Hospital Ship had been appointed for the Reception of either.—And as to the Relief of *Minorca*, he had neither the Battallion on Board; which was to have been sent on that Service; nor could he have spared the Fuziliers, if they had been a Number sufficient for it, which it is notorious they were not, without exposing the Squadron to utter Perdition, either in the Attempt to land them, if it could have been made, or in venturing on a second Engagement without their Assistance.

That however he might not rely on his own Judgment merely, as soon as he had taken the proper Measures to cover the crippled Ships, as also to repair and refit them, as well as it could then be done; he called a Council of War on Board the *Ramillies*; the Result of which is here submitted to the impartial World.

At

At a Council of War assembled, and held on Board his Majesty's Ship the Ramillies, at Sea, on Monday the 24th of May, 1756.

P R E S E N T,

The Hon. JOHN BYNG, Esq; Admiral of the Blue.

Major General <i>Stuart Temple West</i> , Esq;	rear
Capt. <i>Henry Ward</i>	Ad. of the Red
Hon. <i>Edw. Cornwallis</i>	Capt. <i>Philip Durell</i>
Capt. <i>Cha. Catford</i>	Capt. <i>James Young</i>
Hon. <i>Geo. Edgcumbe</i>	Capt. <i>Fred. Cornwall</i>
Capt. <i>John Amberst</i>	Capt. <i>William Parry</i>
Rt. Hon. Earl of <i>Ef-</i>	Capt. <i>Arthur Gardiner</i>
<i>ingham</i>	Hon. <i>Augs. Jo. Hervey</i>
	Capt. <i>William Lloyd</i>
	Rt. Hon. Lord <i>Robert Bertie</i> .

Having read to the Council of War the Opinion of the Engineers, in Regard to throwing in Succours in the Castle of *St. Philips*, the Result of a Council of War held by General *Fowke* at *Gibraltar*, with Regard to embarking a Detachment on Board the Fleet; likewise Admiral *Byng's* Instructions for his Proceedings in the *Mediterranean*; likewise the Order with Regard

gard to the Disposal of the Regiment of Fusiliers, commanded by the Right Honourable Lord *Robert Bertie*, and the Defects of the Ships which received Damage in the Action with the *French* Squadron, the 20th Instant; as also having laid before the Council the State of the Sick, and wounded Men on Board the Ships of the Fleet, propos'd to the Council the following Questions, *viz.*

1. Whether an Attack upon the *French* Fleet, gives any Prospect of relieving *Minorca*?

Unanimously resolved that it would not.

2. Whether, if there was no *French* Fleet cruising off *Minorca*, the *English* Fleet could raise the Siege?

Unanimously of Opinion that the Fleet could not.

3. Whether *Gibraltar* would not be in Danger, by any Accident that might befall this Fleet?

Unanimously agreed that it would be in Danger.

4. Whether an Attack with our Fleet in the present State of it upon that of the *French*, will not endanger the Safety of *Gibraltar*, and expose the Trade of the *Mediterranean* to great Hazard?

Unanimously agreed that it would.

5. Whether it is not most for his Majesty's Service that the Fleet should immediately proceed for *Gibraltar*?

We are unanimously of Opinion, that the Fleet should immediately proceed for Gibraltar.

J. Byng

Ja. Stuart

Temple West

Henry Ward

Phil. Durell

Edward Cornwallis

Ja. Young

Cha. Catford

Fred. Cornwall

Geo. Edgcumbe

William Parry

John Amherst

Arthur Gardiner

Effingham

A. Hervey

Mich. Everitt

William Lloyd

Robert Bertie.

Here then we have Authority as well as Reason, to justify the Admiral's Conduct in every Particular; and at any other Period but this, the unanimous Suffrages of so many Persons of distinguish'd Worth and Honour, would have commanded an universal Acquiescence. But so graceless and shameless are the Times we live in, that Endeavours have been used, even to blast this very Authority, by the Means of a wicked Insinuation, that it was more owing to the ill Opinion entertain'd of the Admiral, than their Conviction of the ill-State of our Affairs: As if it was possible for any such Number of Men to concur in a Prevarication of so infamous a Nature: Namely, to set their Hands to a Paper of such Importance, avowing one Motive, and guided by another.

But to proceed. Agreeable to the last Resolution of the Council of War, the Fleet stood to the Westward in the Afternoon, and after a tedious Passage, (occasion'd partly by contrary Winds, and partly by the Tardiness of the crippled Ships, one of which, the *Intrepid*, was sometimes forc'd to be taken in tow) arriv'd at *Gibraltar* on the 19th.

Here

Here the Admiral found Commodore *Broderick*, who had arriv'd four Days before with five Line of Battle Ships from *England*; (which by the way shew'd, that even the very Cabinet was at last convinc'd of the Necessity of such a Re-inforcement; as a Means to transfer that Superiority to us, which till then had been on the Enemy's Side;) and it is to be observ'd, notwithstanding what has been given out, that the necessity of re-inforcing Admiral *Byng*, was known soon after his sailing from *England*, if not before, as may be seen by the Secretary of the Admiralty's Letter to him by Mr. *Broderick* *; and it is

* *Admiralty Office, May 21, 1756.*

S I R,

“ MY Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having received certain Intelligence, that the *French* are fitting out more Ships at *Toulon*, they have thought proper to re-inforce the Squadron under your Command with the Ships named in the Margin †, by whom this is sent to you.

“ These Ships carry out a Regiment of Soldiers, and will probably take more on Board at *Gibraltar* if they can be spared.

I am, S I R,

Your most humble Servant,

J. C———D.

Hon. Admiral *Byng*,
Mediterranean,

Receiv'd by Captain *Broderick* on the Arrival of the Fleet at *Gibraltar*, the 19th June, 1756.

† *Prince George* of 80 Guns, *Hampton-Court*, *Ipswich*, and *Nassau* of 64 Guns each, and the *Isis* of 50 Guns.

indubitable, that Mr. *Broderick* received his Orders*, and failed before there was a possibility of receiving any Letters from Admiral *Byng*, or any authentic Intelligence relating to his Squadron; though too late to enable the Admiral to answer the supposed Design of the Expedition; and it is likewise absolutely certain, that those very five Ships sailing with the Squadron under his Command, instead of following him too late, would have rendered the Superiority in those Seas indisputable. The *French* Admiral, who knew exactly his Force, would not then have dared to keep the Sea and wait for him.

The Admiral mindful of the Promise he had made to the Board, in one of the *suppress'd* Passages of his Letter, after the Action, “ not to lose a Moment’s Time in
 “ case he found Stores to refit with, and a
 “ Re-inforcement at *Gibraltar*, before he
 “ fought the Enemy again, and once more
 “ gave them Battle;” his first Care was to order the Sick Men of the Fleet, amounting to near 1000, into the Hospital; after which he issued the following Orders. *To wit.*

* His Orders dated the 17th of May.

To all the Captains to refit their Ships for the Sea, with all possible Expedition.

To compleat their Water, having sent some Ships to *Tetuan* for the sake of Dispatch.

To send a-shore as many Carpenters and Sail-Makers, as they could possibly spare from every Ship, to assist the Master Ship-Wright and Store-keeper in carrying on the Service of the Fleet.

To the Captains of Mr. *Broderick's* Squadron, as they were ready for Sea, to send a-shore from each Ship, one Officer, and two petty Officers, with 50 Men, every Morning at Day-light, to assist in surveying the Stores, and selecting such as were fit for Service; as also to make a Report of their Progress every Evening.

To the Master Ship-Wright of *Gibraltar*, together with some Carpenters of the Fleet, to survey the Ships which had received Damage, and to make Report of their Defects.

To the Carpenter of the *Ramillies* to act as Assistant to the Master Ship-Wright in refitting

fitting the Ships which had been damaged in the late Action.

And lastly, to the Agent Victualler, to compleat all the Ships to 70 Days Wine, three Months dry Provisions, four Months Beef and Pork, and to procure fresh Beef for the Seamen while in Port.

All these several Duties and Services were prosecuted with the utmost Diligence, till *July* the first, when the Fleet being nearly ready for the Sea, excepting the *Portland*, reported on a Survey unfit for Service, till careen'd, and the *Intrepid*, still in the *New Mole*, and in no great likelihood of being rendered fit for Service, Time enough to sail with the Fleet, the Admiral came to a Resolution to put to Sea on the 6th following, in quest of the Enemy, and to attempt the Relief of Fort *St. Philip*, which according to the Intelligence he had receiv'd, still continued to hold out: And whereas most of the Sick-seamen were still in the Hospital, incapable of Service; he propos'd to supply that Defect as well as he could, out of the Companies of the *Portland* and *Intrepid*, and by unmanning several of the Frigates, which
were

were to have been left behind: As also to apply to the Governor of *Gibraltar* for two Detachments of Soldiers, each equal to a Battallion, as specify'd in Mr. *Broderick's* Orders, which now could have been spar'd; seeing the Garrison had already been re-inforc'd with one Regiment brought on Board his Squadron, and two more were daily expected from *England*.

But these Resolutions of his, he was not permitted to have the Honour of carrying into Execution: For on the 2d of *July* arrived Sir *Edward Hawke* in the *Antelope*, with the Orders to supersede him, which were executed the same Day in the Manner already communicated to the Public.

And now having given a Sketch of the Admiral's Conduct, from the Day his Commission was bestow'd on him, to the Day he was depriv'd of it; with an Exception to one very short Interval; another Sketch of the Returns he has met with at Home would make the most proper Companion for it: But as something of this Nature has already been done from sufficient Authorities in a late Pamphlet, call'd, *A Letter to a Member of*
Par-

Parliament in the Country, relative to the Case of Admiral Byng, certain supplemental Touches will serve the Purpose as well; and even these need only be thrown in, partly to fortify the Opinion which is gaining Ground every Hour, That both the Admiral and his Fellow-sufferer *G——— F———* have been thus severely dealt with, not so much for any Miscarriage of their own, as to throw a Mist over the Miscarriages of others, and partly to throw a little farther Light on the Origin of the whole Procedure.

And first, as to the Origin; we ought to take shame to ourselves, for having been so long hunting for it, in the *Actions* of the two Parties, and to the no small Entertainment, no doubt, of those in the Cabal; when the Truth is, that it can be found only in their *Words*.

In the Council of War, for Example, held at *Gibraltar*, *May 4*, a Mischief-making Paragraph was inserted, importing, That tho' the Detachment under Consideration, to be sent by Way of Succour to the Besieged at *Minorca*, was not likely at *that Time* to produce any *Effect*, yet it *might* have been

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of

of *great Service*, had it been landed there *before* the Island was actually *attack'd*; and if a Squadron of his Majesty's Ships had been there, to co-operate with the Troops in its Defence and Preservation: And again, the Admiral in his Dispatch to the Secretary of the Admiralty of the same Date from the same Place, is also unguarded enough to say, " If I had been so happy to have arriv'd at *Mahon* before the *French* had landed, I flatter myself I should have been able to have prevented their setting a foot on that Island: But as it has so unfortunately turn'd out, &c.

In both these Paragraphs, those in the first Digestion of Business are by Inference made answerable for all Miscarriages and Misfortunes; and from the Moment their Penetration had made a Shift to keep them to this Discovery, they apparently resolv'd to make use of all the Arts of Recrimination, accompany'd with all the Weight of their Power and Influence.

Then as to the Proofs of such a Procedure, this opening is no sooner made, than like Water they flow in of themselves.

It is not usual to take the Enemy's Word for their own Feats and Performances; because notorious that the Bias of the Story will ever be in their own Favour. And it is certain there is not a Precedent in History to be found of any Process of any Kind, founded upon such Evidence. — But in this Case the Confederates, (not to give them a more severe Appellation,) no sooner receive an *Extract* of the Enemy's Account, pass'd thro' the Hands of one frenchified foreign Minister abroad, to another frenchified foreign Minister at home, un-authenticated in any Manner whatsoever, than, without waiting for the Advices they could not but expect from their own Commander in chief, they not only take the whole upon content, in the *worst Construction* the Words would bear, but also by grafting the superceding Orders upon it, ratify as far as in them lay, the Insult therein offer'd to the Glory of the Nation; to say nothing of the atrocious Injury done to the Officers so superseded.

A Fact incapable of Aggravation; and what will put to the Stretch, the Faith of Posterity to believe; and yet so it is, that *June* the 8th, but nineteen Days after the
Ac-

Action, one Mr. *Cleveland*, Secretary to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in the Name of a good and gracious King, and by Order of their Lordships, thus writes to the Admiral; “ I am commanded by my
 “ Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to
 “ send you herewith, an *Extract* of M. *Gallissoniere*’s Letter to his Court, giving an
 “ Account of the Action, and to acquaint
 “ you, that his Majesty is so much dissatisfied with your Conduct, that he has ordered their Lordships to recall yourself
 “ and Mr *West*, and to send out Sir *Edward Hawke*, and Rear Admiral *Saunders*, to
 “ command the Squadron.”

It is to be observed, that the *Extract* thus inclos’d was not in the Original *French*, but an Office Translation; and yet these are the most material Articles of it. “ The Engagement lasted about three Hours and a Half, or four Hours; but was not general during *all* that Time; the *English* Ships that had suffered most from our Broad-sides, having got to the Windward out of the Reach of the Cannon.

“ They have always preserv’d this Ad-

vantage not to engage, and after having made their *greatest Efforts* against our Rear, which they found so close, and from which they receiv'd so great a Fire, as not to be able to *break* it; they resolv'd to retire, and appear'd no more on the 21st."

The Amount of which is plainly this; That the *French* kept on the Defensive only; That in owning their Rear was expos'd to the Efforts of the *English*, they own they retreated before them, and that if the *English* did not break them, it was for want of sufficient Strength, not of Courage; which, with an Exception to one Circumstance, That they out-fail'd us, corresponds in the Main with our Admiral's own Account, and actually justifies his Conduct without impeaching his Bravery.

But indeed if the Credit of *France* had ever obtained such a Sanction from her Enemies before, neither this or any other Nation would have had one Victory to boast of against her; or a Commander for such a Service to reward: It is a Rule of theirs to be ever victorious; and a Variety of Proofs may
be

be produced of annual *Te Deums* sung for annual Defeats.

In the Case of the great Battle fought off of *Malaga*, in the Year 1704, between the confederate Fleet under Sir *George Rooke*, and that of *France*, under the Count de *Toulouse*, *Louis XIV.* in his Royal Capacity, ascribes the Victory, notwithstanding a great *Superiority* in *Number*, and the *Advantage* of the *Wind* on the Enemy's Side, to his own Fleet, and enjoins a *Te Deum* to be sung accordingly; and yet so little Regard was paid to his *Ipse dixit* here at home, that instead of superceding, disgracing, imprisoning and making a public Victim of *Rooke*, he was complimented by the House of Commons, in their Address to the Queen, as deserving almost as much of his Country for that Year's Service, as the great Duke of *Marlbrough*, who had just won the Battle of *Blenheim*.

There is no need of adding any Thing more on this Topic; every *Englishman's* Indignation will supply the rest.

It has been observ'd, That this unprecedented Order sent by one Admiral to black-
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en and ruin another, was dated *June* the 8th, and it follows of Course, that having once ventur'd to strike so bold a Stroke, the Confederates were under a Necessity of taking every Measure possible, to keep themselves in Countenance for having done so: when therefore, the Admiral's Account came to Hand, which set Matters in so very different a Light, it was incumbent on them to expunge every Passage, which could either help to undeceive the Public in Respect to the Conduct of the Admiral, or to expose (though innocently on his Part) their own: And as those Passages are now in Print, and can and will be prov'd to be genuine, it must be self-evident to every Man, who reads them, that they could be expung'd for no other Reason.

Having already proceeded against him as a beaten Coward, they could not bear he should ever so modestly claim a Victory; much less produce the Proofs; his lying to, to refit, for three Days together, often in Sight of *Minorca*, and of the Enemy's Fleet. Fore-seeing when too late, that the Island would be lost, they resolv'd to place the Loss to his Account,-----knowing *Gibraltar* had

had been taken no * better Care of. They would not suffer him to derive any Merit from covering it.---- Willing to allow a Council of War had been held upon the present Situation, they would by no means have it understood, that it was the present Situation of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*, about which not the least Doubt or Contention arose.— And sensible of what Importance it was to themselves, that our Squadron should be thought superior to that of the Enemy, they falsify'd the Evidence in their Hands, which prov'd it to be otherwise.

Add to this that, not satisfy'd with having, in this perfidious Manner prostituted the *Gazette*, and the sacred Name of *Authority* placed at the Head of it, they caus'd the following Paragraph (for it could come from no other Quarter) to be inserted the *same* Evening, in a Paper known to be under their Influence, if not their Direction.

* See the weak State of the Garrison, as prov'd by General *Forcke* at his Trial; and compare it with the Advice from our Consul at *Carthage*, dated *April 21*, signifying, That twelve Men of War had been order'd thither, from *Cádiz* and *Ferrol*; on what Account he could not explain.

“ We have received the following Circumstances, relating to the Conduct of a Sea-officer in great command, which, we are told, may be depended upon.

“ Though he solicited the Command, he *deferred* sailing from *England*, till very *pressing* Letters were sent him from Authority; many *strange* Delays happened in the Course of the Voyage; he *lost* seven Days at *Gibraltar*, when the utmost Expedition was necessary for the public Service; he was *twelve* Days upon his Passage from *Gibraltar* to the Distance of twelve Leagues off *Minorca*, where the *French* Fleet *happened* to find him; he called a Council as to the *Prudence* of venturing an Engagement; the bad Condition of the Enemy's Fleet occasioned their only maintaining a running Fight; Night, and the *Cautiousness* of our Admiral, put an entire End to the Skirmish; after staying *four* Days, without *seeing* or *seeking* for the Enemy, a Council was called to determine upon the *Expediency* of relieving Fort *St. Philip's*—*the Errand they were sent out upon*; when off *Mabon* Harbour another Council was called, in which it was *resolved*, that the endeavouring to throw in the designed Reinforcements

was too dangerous, and that the Preservation of the Fort was *impossible*; [against this Lord *Effingham Howard* of the Land Forces nobly protested;] another Point determined was, that the Non-appearance of the Enemy's Fleet made it probable they were failed against *Gibraltar*, and therefore, that it was *prudent* to get thither as fast as possible:—Where the *British* Admiral has since remained in perfect *security* and freedom from them."

To every Word of this the Reader has now a sufficient and satisfactory Answer in his Hand; and that he may be further convinc'd, that no Body in the Service, not as yet practic'd upon by the Confederates, either did or could harbour a Thought, similar to the odious Misrepresentations thus artfully and wickedly made of it, an Extract of a Letter to him from Sir *Benjamin Keen*, dated *June* the 14th, is here laid before him.

"As I *hope* this will *meet* you at *Gibraltar*, I lay hold of the earliest Opportunity to return Thanks likewise, for your Favour of the 25th off *Makon*, which enabled me to contradict the *French* Accounts of the Action on the 20th; what they were I presume General *Fowke* will have communicated to you out of my Letters on that

Subject; and, in spite of their ARTIFICES, your remaining Master of the Field of Battle, decides the Advantage to have been on your Side, to the SATISFACTION of all IMPARTIAL PEOPLE."

There is also another Paragraph in the same Letter, which the present critical Situation of the Admiral makes it also necessary to publish: It is true it will involve the Embassador in the original Sin, which has been visited with so much Rigour, not on him only, but also on General *Fowke*, and in some Degree, on almost all the Parties concerned in the Opinions given at the two Councils of War: But as no Pretence can be found for making an Example of him, nor Turn can be serv'd by it, he can apprehend nothing from it.

" I most heartily join with you, Sir, in your Concern, That the *inevitable Obstacles* you had met with in your Navigation, retarded your Presence in the *Mediterranean* so long; and am fully persuaded, that if, EVEN with the Force you then brought, you had been in those Seas, BEFORE the *French* had engag'd themselves in the Enterprize, they would not have undertaken it: But as soon as they KNEW both the NUMBER of

your Ships and their QUALITIES, and had COMPARED them with *their own*, they persisted in their Attempt, and would risk a Battle, though not an entire Defeat."

Whether Sir *Benjamin* made use of the same Language in his Letters to the Confederates, can be only known to themselves; but if he did, they paid it no Regard; and contrarywise went on as they had began, in exciting the Populace against the Admiral, by every wicked Device in their Power, and making their own Court to them at his Expence.

Thus a Merit was made in the *Gazette* and other News Papers, of an Order sent to all the Ports to put him under an Arrest, as soon as he arriv'd; which was done accordingly at *Portsmouth* on the 26th of *July*.

Whether these Orders were regular or not, it is certain they were as unusual as severe. Messrs. *Matthews* and *Lestock* were to the full as obnoxious to the Justice of their Country, as Mr. B— had been represented to be, and yet they were left at full Liberty, as if no Charge could be maintain'd against them, or no Consequence was to be expected from it.

And though Admiral B -- and Rear Admiral *West* had been equally involved in, and

disgrac'd by the superceding Orders, (which the Former in his animated Letter to Mr. *Cleveland* thereon, on Mr. *West's* Behalf in the most gallant Manner resent'd) special Care was now taken to sunder them by the most invidious Distinctions. For while one was kept a close Prisoner on Board the *Antelope*, the other was not only permitted to repair to *London*, but was caress'd in the most extraordinary Manner.

Particulars recollected at this Time, not for the Sake of insinuating ever so remotely, that these Favours were unworthily bestow'd on a Man whom the Admiral still continues to esteem as highly as he deserves; but of reminding the Public of the inhumane use that was made of them, in the following Article of News, dated *July 28!* at the Drawing-Room at *Kensington*, where there was the greatest Levee that has been known for many Months, Admiral *West* was distinguish'd by his Majesty in a very particular Manner, who was pleas'd to say, "Admiral *West*, I
 " am glad to see you; I return you my
 " thanks for your gallant Behaviour; and
 " wish every Admiral had follow'd your Ex-
 " ample."

It was obvious, this was meant to give the
Coup-

Coup-de-Grace to the Admiral and his Cause.—For if the Public could be persuaded that the King had already pre-judg'd and pre-condemn'd, who should presume to absolve him? And with such an Air of Confidence deliver'd to the Public as this Article was, who but those of the first-Rate understandings, would have been able to discover the Forgery, by reflecting on the utter Impossibility, that the sovereign-Judge should thus openly declare himself a Party, or that the Current of Justice should run polluted from its very Source?

After this Piece of Practice then (which was sufficient to humble the stoutest Heart) we are not to wonder at the Load of Indignities, Hardships, and Outrages, since heap'd upon him.

His Letter to Mr. *Cleveland*, giving Notice of his Arrival, and inclosing a Duplicate of his former upon his being superseded, serv'd only to produce an Order from the Admiralty, directing the Marshal to take him into his Custody, and continue him, for the Present, on Board the *Antelope*, though it might be suppos'd his Health, and it was manifest his Situation, requir'd all the Helps and Consolations that the Shore and his Friends and Relations could give him.

And

And after he had been accordingly continued there some Time, the Head of a certain Board, was graciously pleas'd to intimate, That when he was weary of his Birth he would apply for a Removal----which, however, did not happen, till the melancholy Incident of his Brother's Death, (which had also the most barbarous Constructions put upon it) oblig'd him----and then he was only remov'd from one Ship to another.

When order'd up to *London August* the 5th, he was surrounded with a Guard of Soldiers, though an Admiralty-Prisoner, and when remanded upon the Road (because those who had sent for him were not as yet agreed how to dispose of him) he was remanded on Ship-board again.

On his second Removal on the 9th following, guarded as before, he was not appriz'd, till he came as far as *Kingston*, whither he was to be convey'd; and when brought to *Greenwich* after Midnight, found no Provision of any kind made for his Reception.

Though still an Admiral, the Son of a Peer, and a Member of Parliament, he was hoisted up to the Top of the Hospital, into an Apartment where People were yet a-bed,
and

and where he was told, he was to accommodate himself as well as he could; which for the Remainder of the Night he did accordingly, by making choice of the Floor and his Portmanteau:

In this Situation, obliged to furnish his own Prison with every Convenience it wanted, he thought it high Time, to put their Lordships of the Admiralty in Mind, that no Body in the like Case had ever been used with such Rigour before: But their Lordships were not condescending enough to honour him with any Reply.

On the contrary, Centinels were placed at his Door, the Marshal was order'd to keep him as closely confined as possible, the Governor play'd the Part of Goaler in Chief, pleading sometimes Lord A——'s Orders, and sometimes Orders of Council for it; so that every Hour made it more and more dubious, whether he was the Governor's Prisoner, or the Marshal's Prisoner, consequently whether he was to be try'd by a Court-Martial, or as an Offender against the State.

And during this whole Interval, his Character was deliver'd over to the Populace, to gratify upon it the worst Passions, that the worst Artifices and Instruments could raise;

in so much, that there is not a Species of Libelling in Prints, in Verse, or in Prose, that has not been exhausted to render him odious: The very Ghost of his reverend Father has been raised, advising him to lay violent Hands on himself—Last dying Speeches and Confessions have been prepared for him.—Mock Executions have been spirited up to make the Way easy for a real one; and Epitaphs fit only for the Devil himself to inspire, have consigned him over to everlasting Infamy: Forgetting, that the worse the Case, the less Need there is of Aggravation, and that an over Charge implies a Defect of real Matter.

But whatever Effect these wretched Devices have had on the Rabble they were address'd to, they have had none on him—unconscious of having done any Thing inconsistent with his Duty, or even his Instructions—or unbecoming his Station in the severest Sense considered, he has all along regarded them with the Disdain, the Contempt and the Derision they so justly deserve: Nor is it to be understood, that any one Complaint herein letter'd, concerning his past or present Sufferings, ever rose from him—His Resentments, if he may be allow'd to have
any,

any, arising from much higher Considerations.

It will not be deny'd, however, that, after his Adversaries had in this Way beggar'd both their Wit and their Malice, they did hit upon an Expedient, which not only ruffled the Composure he had till then preserv'd, but rais'd his Indignation.—This was the shameless Forgery, of his attempting to make his Escape in his Sisters Cloaths; of which he had so much the quicker Sense, because the only Concern he had at Heart was the Vindication of his Honour; and that he well knew could only be done effectually by a Trial as public as the Injury it had sustain'd. Had therefore the Prison-Doors been thrown open for him, he would not have purchased Liberty and Life at so dear a Rate: And were his Trial to be dropt on the Side of his Prosecutors, they would find he himself would insist upon it, according to a Resolution he had taken from the Moment his Flag was struck.

Whether it will or can be a fair one, after what has been said and done to set the whole World against him, and the Precedent already set in the Case of G—— F——, let the Reader judge for himself when he comes to the End of this Narrative.

The bare Hint of an Escape, though start-
K ed

ed only by themselves, and never so much as dreamt of by the Prisoner, was now to be countenanced by new Precautions, such as additional Bolts and Bars, additional Guards of Soldiers, and as if all were not sufficient, a Boatswain and twelve Men of the Hospital by way of Supplement, to watch in the Court below.

Nor was it long before this new Officer was made, to see four Men at his Window in the Middle of the Night ; upon which the Alarm was given, strict Search was made, the Officer upon Duty leading the Way,----and though these Men in *Buckram* were not to be found, nor any Trace that they had ever been there (the Marshal himself sleeping in the outer Room, and his Prisoner in the Inner,) yet this Figment was also to have an Air of Truth thrown upon it, by a further Parade of new Fortifications-----No less than eleven Smiths being the next Day set to work, by the officious Governor, assisted by a proportionable Number of Bricklayers, to wall up suspected Doors, (indeed to leave but one open, for the Use of a Water Closet only, two Stairs down was now forbid) and not only to bar up all the Windows, but (as if they had thought him capable of performing the famous Bottle Miracle) even the very

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Chim-

Chimneys too*.

For what Purposes these wise Measures were taken, and this extraordinary Vigilance was shewn, is not worth Enquiry. But if it was to shew, the Prisoner was to expect no Favour, the Trouble might have been spar'd, for that had been already proclaim'd by every M——and every one of their Echoes; who were known to talk of his Destiny, on all Occasions, with as much Confidence, as if it was hardly in the Power of Providence itself, to rescue him out of their Hands.

As therefore, they had, in the most public Manner, before declar'd, if not bespoke the Royal Displeasure against him, so these sanguinary Discourses serv'd as a proper Lesson to all their Dependents and Followers--- Admiral B---- was the stricken Deer, which all were to unite in goring out of the Herd. And it was to be understood of Course, that to entertain a Doubt concerning him, much more to drop any Expression in his Behalf, or shew him Countenance by any personal Advance or Civility, was an Offence unpardonable both against King and Country.

* The worthy *Governor or Goal*er was so jealous that his Care and Diligence was not sufficiently conspicuous, that he reprimanded the Workmen for not having made the Bars across the Chimney Tops to project, so that all Persons passing might see them.

Out of some Mouths a Hint is a Warning, and a Caution a Menace: And to the Disgrace of human Nature, they have had their full Effect, wherever they have been communicated: These in Possession, and those in Expectancy of Preferment, have been intimidated alike: And what is worst of all, the rendering him unpopular, has render'd those who bid for Popularity, almost as fearful of appearing for him, as those in the Service, not to take a Part against him.

Let it be imagined then what Difficulties he has to struggle with, even in prosecuting the common Forms of his Defence; and what he has further to apprehend from a Continuance of the same indirect Practices, which have hitherto been made to operate so notoriously to his Prejudice.

Instead of sinking, however, under such a Variety of Pressures, as it is probable his Enemies hop'd he would, and meant he should, he has never yet betray'd the least Sign of Dejection or Dismay, much less of Distrust in his Cause; but, on the contrary, has manifested the same uniform Composure, except in the single Instance of the forged Escape, through the whole Series of his Persecutions. — This is a Truth his said Enemies are well appriz'd of, would fain suppress
if

if it were in their Power, and endeavour to falsify as much as they can. — But tho' they may pronounce him guilty, they cannot make him so; and till condemn'd by his own Conscience, he will to the last Gasps assert and maintain his Innocence.

The Events of War are uncertain---so it is said in his Majesty's most gracious Answer to the *London* Address; and so it has always been said ever since Mankind recorded their Miseries. But, according to the Procedure now carrying on against Admiral B—, the Commander that cannot convert Uncertainties into Certainties, must run his Country or forfeit his Head,—Ministers are but Men, and Men are all fallible—such has been the Voice of the World till now—but now the World is to learn a new Creed—That more or less Power bestows more or less Infallibility; and consequently, that he who has the most, must always be most in the Right.

It has hitherto been esteem'd a national Duty to assert national Honour, and more especially against the open Attacks of an open Enemy—But now it seems the Reverse is to be the Practice; and those who have the Lead amongst us, are not only become so complaisant as to give up the Point of Honour on the first Challenge, but their Cham-
pion

pion too, or as the Vulgar would express it; whatever M. de la *Galissoniere* says, they are ready to SWEAR.

And upon the whole; let every thinking Man in *Britain* ask himself a few such Questions as these: Whether the putting such a Change as this upon him is not one of the highest Affronts that could be put upon his Understandings? Whether in the Case of Admiral *B*—— it has not been put upon the whole Community? Whether any Pretence of Delusion, Rashness, Prejudice, Wantonness, or even Connection and Influence can excuse any Man for suffering himself to be made an Accessary to it? And whether it has not a direct Tendency to ruin the Service both by Sea and Land, by discouraging Men of Parts and Character from engaging in it, and thereby throwing it wholly into the Hands of Fools and Madmen; since none but such will accept a Commission on the ignominious Terms of serving with a Halter about their Necks, that a Knot of domineering Grandees may be exempt not only from Punishment but Imputation?

E R R A T A.

Pag. 7. l. 17. after the Word *in*, add, *the Torbay* with
P. 11. l. 3. for *repaid*, read, *returned*.

F I N I S.

